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Chapter II
International Law and
Naval and Air Operations at Sea
by
Bernard H. Oxman*

Introduction
,...., he publication of The Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations
..l. {NWP-9} is a suitable occasion for reconsidering the relationship
between international law and naval and air operations at sea in times of
peace.!
The Handbook is replete with articulations of specific rules and principles
of the law of the sea that may be of use to the naval or air commander. Its
purpose is "general guidance" and "not a comprehensive treatment of the
law."2 The rules and principles it articulates relating to navigation and
overflight are expressly based on those set forth in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea,3 ,"[a]lthough not signed by the United
States and not yet in formal effect."4 The Handbook could hardly be
significantly more faithful to the text of the ConventionS had the United States
ratified the text of the Convention and Congress enacted penalties for its
violation.
Still the Handbook contains interesting innovations not found in the
Convention. For example, use of the terms "national waters" and
"international waters"6 was doubtless designed to facilitate an explication
to the non-expert of the law of naval and air operations in the exclusive
economic zone. 7 If the summa divisio between "national" and "international"
waters persists as su~h in coastal areas-a matter open to some doubt-it
might be useful for the commander to know that the classifications set forth
in the Handbook might prove controversial. Unlike the authors of the Handbook,
some coastal states would regard the exclusive economic zone as falling within
the former category and at least some commentators might regard
international straits (and comparable archipelagic sealanes) as falling within
the latter category.
Another arguable innovation is the concept of "assistance entry" into the
territorial sea. 8 The concept is appropriately rooted in the ancient duty of
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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mariners "to assist those in danger of being lost at sea. ''9 Although the Law
of the Sea Convention does not expressly address the question of entry into
the territorial sea for the purpose of rescue, textual support can be found
in the newly articulated and analogous principle of the Convention that
permits stopping and anchoring while in innocent passage through the
territorial sea "for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or
aircraft in danger or distress. "10 In the principle that the sovereignty of the
coastal state over the territorial sea is subject to other rules of international
law,l1 and in the principle that the coastal state's rights and jurisdiction must
be exercised in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right,12 one
can find ample basis for concluding that the coastal state's rights must be
interpreted in light of the ancient duty to rescue, and that the coastal state
is presumed to consent to bona fide efforts to rescue those in danger of being
lost at sea.
Probably in order to avoid too much confusing detail, the Handbook is also
less than complete on the question of straits overlapped by internal waters.t 3
Article 35(a) of the Law of the Sea Convention makes it clear that the regime
of straits applies to internal waters established by a system of straight baselines
in accordance with the Convention where the waters enclosed were not
previously considered internal (that is they would not be regarded as juridical
bays, for example). Why then, except perhaps for reasons of economy of text,
is overflight excluded from transit passage of such straits?14 Why is the
discussion of international straits essentially limited to "International Straits
Overlapped by Territorial Seas?"15
All (or at least almost all) of this is as it should be. Taken as a whole, the
Handbook should achieve its purposes admirably. This writer has expressed
his specific views on the legal rules governing naval and air operations at
sea elsewhere, and will not repeat them here. 16
What the Handbook does not address, or addresses only in passing, is why
those concerned with naval and air operations at sea should be concerned
with the international law of the sea. Such an analysis is probably beyond
the scope of a handbook of the kind addressed here. But the analysis is essential
, if one is to understand what one is probably reading, and why one is reading
it, when one refers to the Handbook.

The Duty to Obey International Law
From the perspective of the naval commander, a fairly simple answer can
be posed to the question, "Why worry about international law?" As the
Handbook notes,17 article 0605 of U.S. Navy Regulations, 1973, states:
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At all times, a commander shall observe and require his command to observe the
principles of international law. Where necessary to the fulfillment of this responsibility,
a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

The Handbook also attempts an explanation of the underlying reasons for
this duty:
International law provides stability in international relations and an expectation that
certain acts or omissions will effect predictable consequences. If one nation violates the
law, it may expect that others will reciprocate. Consequently, failure to comply with
international law ordinarily involves greater political and economic costs than does
observance.l8

The Handbook does not stop there however. It ventures into the complex
world of law and interest when it states, "In short, nations comply with
international law because it is in their interest to do so. "19 This sentence is
not without its ambiguities. Legal restraints are of particular significance
when one perceives an interest in ignoring those restraints. What the authors
presumably mean is that the interest in observing international law ordinarily
outweighs the perceived interest in acting otherwise in a particular instance.
The brief discussion concludes with a declaration at once as terse and as
pregnant as one is likely to encounter: "Like most rules of conduct,
international law is in a continual state of development and change."2O
Nothing at all is said about the role of the Handbook itself in this process.
As for the role of naval and air forces, the Handbook asserts:
When maritime nations appear to acquiesce in excessive maritime claims and fail
to exercise their rights actively in the face of constraints on international navigation
and overflight, those claims and constraints may, in time, be considered to have been
accepted by the international community as reflecting the practice of nations and as
binding upon all users of the seas and superjacent airspace. Consequently, it is incumbent
upon maritime nations to protest through diplomatic channels all excessive claims of
coastal or island nations, and to exercise their navigation and overflight rights in the
face of such claims. The President's Oceans Policy Statement makes clear that the u.S.
has accepted this responsibility as a fundamental element of its national policy.21

What the Handbook appears to be saying is that because the law may evolve
and change, it is important for the United States to influence that process,
where appropriate, using its naval and air forces to that end. More than that,
the Handbook appears to be used to resist attempts by other states to change
the law, particularly "excessive maritime [presumably coastal state] claims"
and "constraints on international navigation and overflight." The "law" that
the United States will defend is expressly identified with the rules of the Law
of the Sea Convention affecting navigation and overflight rights.
We have now moved beyond a mere duty to respect international law as
it is now or as it may evolve in the future. The law of the sea, at least that
part of it governing naval and air operations at sea, has itselfbecome an object
of those operations. Why?
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International Law and Large Navies
Large navies operate around the world. Their ships approach or enter the
territory of many states. Their operations are subject to scrutiny within their
own government and legislature, by their own press and public at least in
democratic states, and by the governments, press and people of foreign
countries, whether friendly or hostile. Alone or in combination, every one
of these groups has some actual or potential influence on the ability to define
naval missions and to carry them out. The question of whether they should
have such influence is beside the point.
Few naval missions (other than purely humanitarian assistance) are likely
to be applauded by everyone. Even a peaceful visit to a port of a friendly
country may be an implicit warning to others. The capacity to define and
carry out naval missions is maximized if one maximizes the number of people
with influence over the definition or execution of the mission who believe
that:
(1) the specific mission is desirable;
(2) navies should have the right to conduct that kind of activity in the
manner undertaken; and
(3) navies do have the right to conduct that kind of activity in the manner
undertaken.
Human nature being what it is, there is some likelihood that an individual
who falls within group 1 will also fall within group 2, and that an individual
who falls within group 2 will also fall within group 3. However, not everyone
who falls within group 1 or even 2 will necessarily fall within group 3. For
example, some people who believe that Israel's rescue of hostages in Entebbe
or even its raid on the Iraqi nuclea~ reactor were, if viewed in isolation,
desirable, also believe that such intrusions into the territory of a foreign state
are (and should be) of doubtful legality.
Moreover, what if a significant number of people with actual or potential
influence over the definition or execution of the mission do not believe that
the specific mission, or its mode of execution, is desirable? The objective in
that case to achieve their acquiescence is facilitated (but by no means
guaranteed) if they are persuaded either that the navy should, or that it does,
have a right to carry out the mission in the manner contemplated.22 To put
the matter differently, the political, economic or military resources that must
be expended to achieve acquiescence are minimized, and often eliminated,
if those whose acquiescence is sought believe a navy does or should have a
right to undertake the action in the manner contemplated.23
Since no government's political, economic, or military resources are
unlimited, the more costly it is to achieve acquiescence, the more limited
are a government's options to choose and execute its naval missions.
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Accordingly, perceptions of what the law is or should be by people with
influence over the definition or execution of the mission have a real influence
over the range of a government's naval options.

Whose Acquiescence is Important?
For purposes of this analysis, a naval or air mission might be divided into
three parts: the objective, the means, and the logistics.
We might assume, for example, that the proposition up.for decision is
delivering a warning to some government or group in the eastern
Mediterranean region designed to deter violence or escalation of violence on
land or at sea. We might assume further that the means under consideration
are a substantial augmentation of naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean
Sea. Finally, we might assume that the augmentation would require the
movement of ships from the Atlantic Ocean and perhaps the Indian Ocean,
the former through the Strait of Gibraltar and the latter through the Strait
of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal.
The classic argument for maintaining and using a large surface navy in this
manner is nicely summarized in the Handbook:
Depending upon the magnitude and immediacy of the problem, naval forces may be
positioned near areas of potential discord as a show of force or as a symbolic expression
of support and concern. Unlike land-based forces, naval forces may be so employed
without political entanglement and without the necessity of seeking littoral nation
consent.24

Three aspects of this statement require emphasis. First, it is normally
assumed that the naval forces will be positioned "near areas of potential
discord," that is near land, and may engage in naval maneuvers once there.25
This is true whether one wishes to influence the behavior of regular or
irregular land forces or the behavior of armed ships or boats likely to operate
mainly in coastal areas. Second, it is normally assumed that some
"positioning" in response to the specific mission is required, i.e. that the ships
will have to be moved into position from elsewhere. Third, it is assumed that
the positioning may be achieved "without political entanglement and without
the necessity of seeking littoral nation consent."
Taken together, these assumptions presuppose the acquiescence of three
different classes of foreign states. The first class comprises the state or states
near whose coast the force will be positioned. The second class consists of
the state or states off whose coast the ships will navigate en route to their
position. The third class embraces other states with global or "blue water"
navies.26
Let us assume that states in all three classes either oppose, do not wish to
support, or do not wish to appear to support the mission. The question then
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becomes one of acquiescence. The various classes of states will be examined
in reverse order in this connection.

1. Other Naval Powers
Much attention is normally devoted to the third class and, in particular,
the Soviet Union. History has demonstrated that the United States and Soviet
navies and air forces, notwithstanding occasional lapses into pubescent
behavior,27 are reluctant to engage each other far from their shores (and
exercise at least relative caution even in their own waters). The reaction of
other major naval powers is therefore ordinarily a political rather than strictly
military consideration, although one must of course bear in mind that political
cost may reduce one's flexibility to undertake a mission.
Moreover, because the same rules normally apply to all, it may be assumed
that governments with large navies generally believe all states have, or should
have, the right to do what large navies generally do. In other words, much
as the Soviet Union may dislike a particular United States naval mission in
the eastern Mediterranean Sea, or the United States may dislike a particular
Soviet naval mission in the Caribbean Sea, each is likely not only to concede
(albeit privately) the legal right of the other to do what it is doing, but perhaps
even welcome (albeit silently) the augmentation of state practice in support
of the kinds of operations large navies undertake.28
From this analysis, one may draw at least the following inferences regarding
the effect of the international law of the sea on the acquiescence of other
naval powers in operations off the coasts of third states. The naval powers
have no desire to engage each other directly. The law of the sea would appear
to be relevant to the degree of acquiescence obtained from other naval powers
in two different ways. If the naval powers disagree on what the law of the
sea rules are or should be, and that disagreement involves the question of
whether there has been an incursion on the territory or rights bf a third state
by the naval power undertaking the mission, the disagreement could force
a more severely negative reaction by the other naval power either in principle
or because of political or defense commitments to the third state. Conversely,
if the naval powers agree on what the law of the sea rules are, and those
rules are observed, the perception that the power undertaking the mission
is within its rights-and that other naval powers wish to preserve the right
to do the same thing elsewhere-may increase the degree of acquiescence,
that is dampen the political opposition.
This is the first illustration of a basic point central to the relationship
between the law of the sea and naval and air operations at sea: to the extent
that the law of the sea is relevant to the question of acquiescence by a foreign
power, its relevance depends not on what the naval power undertaking the
mission believes its rights to be, or even on whether that belief is well founded
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in law, policy or good morals, but rather on whether the powers concerned
agree or disagree with each other on what the rules are.

2. States Off Whose Coast Ships Will Navigate En Route to Their Position
The Handbook assumes that ships will be able to navigate to their intended
position "without political entanglement and without the necessity of seeking
littoral nation consent." In this case, the reference is therefore to the
acquiescence of states off whose coasts ships will navigate en route to their
position. In this connection, the political, military, and psychological question
of what constitutes a route close to the coast of another country must be
distinguished from the strictly legal question of what rights a state may claim
and exercise in waters off its coast. For purposes of this analysis, the
acquiescence of a state "off whose coast" one must navigate is relevant if
that state has the means and the will to disrupt, or otherwise increase the
political, economic or military cost of, the mission.
A route close to land may be selected because of geographic necessity. For
example, a ship cannot enter or leave the Mediterranean Sea without
traversing a strait (or canal) at some point. Some seas are so constricted that
one is rarely far from land. A route close to land may be selected for reasons
of safety or weather. It may also be selected because it is substantially shorter
and more convenient than an alternative route. The same considerations may
apply in the case of military aircraft where consent to overfly land territory
is unavailable.29
The acquiescence of states along a selected route therefore affects the
mobility of naval forces as well as the mobility of air forces for which consent
to overfly land territory is unavailable. Such acquiescence affects naval and
air transports in the same way, whether used to move ground or amphibious
forces or to deliver material to friendly foreign forces. The number of states
potentially involved is large and difficult to predict. It depends on the location
of possible missions, the location of ships when assigned spch missions, and
the routes selected.
In considering the implications of this problem, one must bear in mind that
states do not have balanced bilateral reciprocal interests in the right to
navigate off each other's coast without consent.30
One reason for the imbalance relates to geographic position. Not many
states have an overwhelming interest in navigating close to the coast of the
United States without consent, despite the enormity of the Unitecl.States
coastline. Many would perceive a far greater interest in navigating close to
England and France, Spain and Morocco, Greece and Turkey, Oman and Iran,
or Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Another reason for the imbalance relates to naval capacity, defense
strategy, and foreign policy. Very few states maintain global navies or a
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defense strategy or foreign policy that entails deployment of their navies at
great distances from their own shores. While it is true that a significant
number of states rely, explicitly or implicitly, on the mobility of a global
navy for protection from another global power or ambitious regional powers,
not many are likely to attach a high priority to this interest without insistent
reminders from their naval ally. Moreover, in some regions, particularly semienclosed seas, it is fashionable to believe that elimination of the right of
warships (of global navies) to navigate in the region would, by removing the
great naval powers, promote peace and stability. These views are sometimes
inspired by regional powers whose ambitions may be held in check by the
actual or potential presence of a global navy.
The significance of the imbalance means that unlike other naval powers,
states along the route taken to a mission position will not necessarily perceive
a strong interest (if any) in the proposition that navies should generally have
the right to navigate close to the coast in order to take the necessary or most
convenient route to their mission destination. Thus, to the extent one wishes
to encourage their acquiescence in the use of the route off their coast, one
must often rely more on their perception of what the law is than on their
perception of what the law should be.
The acquiescence of this particular group of states is central to any concept
of flexibility to deploy forces at sea. Prudence requires the planner to
anticipate that a naval force may provoke political resistance and retaliation,
or even armed resistance, once the force reaches its mission position
(especially when the very purpose of the mission is to deter violent behavior
by those in the region). But what if, even in peacetime, the decision-maker
must deal with such contingencies not only at the mission destination but in
connection with the movement of ships to their destination?
Several methods for promoting acquiescence are possible. One is the threat
of armed resistance or retaliation. A cost of this approach is that every naval
mission then requires the potential diversion of additional military resources
to yet another mission, namely defense of the means to reach -the_@ssion
destination. In addition, the political or economic costs of threatening friends
and the military costs of threatening adversaries may be too high.
Another method is the threat of economic retaliation. Such retaliation is
in fact more difficult than it appears. Those responsible for international trade
policy can be expected to resist interference with trade either in principle
or because the United States as well as the target state would be hurt.
Moreover, absent an extreme emergency, forceful military or economic
measures are unlikely to be used unless those individuals with substantial
influence over decisions by the government of a major naval power believe
there is a legal right to use the route in question. In other words, before one
can effectively pressure the foreign state to acquiesce, one must have
persuaded one's domestic constituency of the right to use the route. That
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constituency will include all relevant participants in government decisionmaking (including defense and foreign ministry lawyers), members of the
legislature, informed and influential members of the public, and at least some
influential friendly foreign leaders. Therefore, even if one chooses to ignore
international law as such as the means to obtain acquiescence from the foreign
states concerned, one would probably need to use international law to
persuade the relevant domestic constituency to threaten military or economic
retaliation.
One also may purchase acquiescence. Those familiar with the full political,
military, and economic costs of some base-rights agreements could doubtless
appreciate what it would cost to buy, on a bilateral basis, acquiescence in
the right to navigate along all foreign coasts likely to lie astride the approaches
to possible mission destinations. As previously noted, very few states would
perceive a reciprocal interest in the right to operate warships (or even
merchant ships) off the United States coast. Most would wish something in
return that they would not otherwise receive; many would insist that the value
to them of what is received be comparable to the value to the United States
of the mobility of its naval forces; a goodly number would reserve an explicit
or implicit right to renegotiate terms or end the arrangement; and some would
refuse (or would be forced by political pressures to refuse) to deal at any
conceivably acceptable price}1 One must also bear in mind that purchasing
(agreeing bilaterally on the existence of) rights to navigate in one place
arguably implies that exercising such rights in similar areas elsewhere requires
agreement of the coastal state.
This analysis suggests that the international law of the sea would be a useful
tool in helping to induce the acquiescence of foreign states lying along the
route to a particular mission. A variety of tactical considerations reinforce
this conclusion.
While the number of states that perceive a direct interest in the global
mobility of warships may be small, the number that perceive an important
interest in the free movement of international trade by sea is quite large. By
linking the two in a single principle of freedom of navigation or free transit
of straits, one can substantially increase the number of governments that
believe all ships (and therefore warships) should have a right to navigate along
the coast where necessary to reach their destination.
Some governments would have difficulty gaining domestic acceptance of
the premise that all warships, or warships of a particular state, have been
accorded a right to navigate off the coast. Their capacity to act on the basis
of such a premise is enhanced if the right is not localized, but rather derives
from a global rule applicable to all similarly situated coastal states
everywhere.
This being said, we must recall the object of th.e exercise: inducing the
acquiescence of states lying along the routes used to reach the mission
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destination despite their opposition to, or unwillingness to support, the mission
itself. This is then the second illustration of the basic point, referred to earlier,
central to the relationship between the law of the sea and air operations at
sea.
The challenge then is to affect the perceptions of others as to what the
law is (what some term their "expectations").
One way is to persuade them that the particular proffered rule oflaw serves
their interests. The potential for using this approach has already been
discussed.
Another way is to rely on habit. There is some tendency to associate the
factual status quo with the legal status quo. If your neighbor crosses your land
regularly, you are more likely to believe that he has a right to do so or, perhaps
more importantly, that you would be disrupting good-neighborly relations
("legitimate expectations founded on custom") if you tried to stop him. Thus,
whatever the theoretical relationship between a program of exercise of rights
and the preservation of rights under international law, foreign states as a
practical matter are more likely to acquiesce in activities off their coasts that
occur regularly and without serious impairment of their interests.
Still another way is to influence directly the foreign state's perceptions
of legitimacy, that is, to operate from a platform of principle likely to be
accepted by the foreign state in determining its own behavior. One thing is
certain: ·a platform of principle unilaterally enunciated by the naval power
(including its legislature and its domestic partisans) is not likely to be regarded
by foreign states as "law" necessarily binding on them.
To induce foreign acquiescence in navigation rights important to naval
mobility, we must find propositions that:
(1) are understood to allow activities important to naval mobility, and
(2) are accepted as law by the states off whose coast one must navigate.
The most commonly cited repository of such propositions is called
customary international law, fairly defined by the Handbook as the "general
and consistent practice among nations with respect to a particular subject,
which over time is accepted by them generally as a legal obligation. "32 But
if this is so, have we come full circle?
The object of the exercise was to use law, rather than or in conjunction
with other means, to induce foreign acquiescence at the lowest possible cost.
Yet we are now told that this law rests on general and consistent practice
among nations. Therefore, in order to ensure our first objective, namely that
the law is understood to allow activities important to naval mobility, we will
have to discourage states everywhere in the world from engaging in practices
to the contrary. Whether we are especially interested in the actual or potential
need to use an area off the coast of a particular state, we must discourage
the emergence of new practices inconsistent with our view of what the
relevant law is and needs to be.
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When we object to the change in practice, the foreign state could accurately
quote the Handbook: "[LJike most rules of conduct, international law is in a
continual state of development and change. "33 The foreign state might add:
If law changes, and if customary international law is rooted in general
practice, then the only way customary law can change is if general practice
changes, and the only way general practice can change is if someone starts
the process alone.
How then do we ensure that state practice is generally consistent with the
existence of rights necessary to naval mobility? One way is by investing
political, economic, and even military resources in the endeavor. This means
that those concerned with the maintenance of an international law of the sea
that encourages acquiescence of foreign states in naval operations must
constantly persuade their colleagues in government that this is an objective
worth the investment of national resources. Their task is not an easy one.
The same people are frequently asking for money to acquire and maintain
the ships and personnel necessary to have a navy. The political or economic
costs of doing more than protesting adverse claims (practice) by a foreign
coastal state are likely to be more immediate or apparent t~an the abstract
erosion of a legal position.
Another possibility is to place more direct emphasis on the element of
acceptance of a legal obligation and less on practice. One example would
be a treaty setting forth the relevant rules and accepted by all. This is exactly
what was attempted in the negotiation of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.34 But for serious disagreements on the question of
mining of seabed hard minerals in areas beyond (at times well beyond) 200
miles from any land, it appears that the Convention might have achieved very
widespread ratification, thus by definition setting forth rules regarded by
foreign states as legally binding on them. Moreover, since the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, a very large number of states
seem prepared to accept all or virtually all of the propositions set forth in
the Convention as an authoritative source of law binding on all.
The Handbook, the Statement of the President on United States Oceans
Policy,35 and other government statements represent an effort to use the treaty
strategy under the rubric of customary international law. They declare that
the propositions set forth in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea reflect
customary international law. Where the Convention text is sufficiently
precise, legal argument is then largely confined to interpretation of the text
as if it were a treaty, with little if any attention devoted to state practice.
States that make claims or undertake activities regarded as inconsistent with
the propositions set forth in the Convention are told that their activities are
inconsistent with the Convention and therefore illegal under customary
international law.

30

Law of Naval Operations

The reason for this approach is obvious. The propositions set forth in the
Convention are generally understood to allow activities important to naval
mobility. Because the Convention was negotiated largely by a consensus
procedure over a long period of time with the participation of the entire
community of states, it enjoys substantial legitimacy as a source of rules
binding on all. Thus, from the perspective of naval mobility, there is nothing
to gain and a great deal to lose by allowing inconsistent state practice to
overtake the Convention as a source oflaw in any specific instance or, even
more importantly, in principle.
It is open to serious doubt whether a government that refuses to ratify the
Convention, or even to renegotiate the objectionable deep seabed mining
provisions, can succeed in the long run in persuading foreign governments
to respect as law the provisions of the Convention affecting navigation,
overflight and related naval activities. But the authors of the Handbook,
compelled to accept that risk for the present, are almost certainly correct
in concluding that treating the Convention as if it were a treaty in force for
all, including positive "enforcement" of its provisions if need be, represents
a policy regarding the law of the sea most likely to achieve the underlying
naval objective: acquiescence by others in activities important to naval
mobility at the lowest possible cost.
It is in this context that the provisions of the Handbook regarding the exercise
and assertion of navigation and overflight rights and freedoms might be
understood. 36 The strategy for inducing foreign acquiescence in naval
activities seems to be one of combining habit with the textual legitimacy of
the Convention. The Convention serves a double function in this regard. First,
it is the most plausible platform of principle from which to seek to encourage
foreign acquiescence. Second, because of its international pedigree, it is the
most plausible platform of principle from which to seek domestic support
for a sometimes risky or costly program of exercise of rights and freedoms
designed to establish a pattern, or habit, of naval activity around the world
permitted by the Convention (at least as understood by the United States).
3. States Near Whose Coast the Force Will be Positioned
Much of the analysis set forth in the previous section is relevant to the
question of positioning forces off a state "without the necessity of seeking
littoral state consent." The most important new element is that the objective
of deploying forces "without political entanglement" becomes a larger part
of the equation.
In principle, it is of course difficult to station a naval force off any area
of actual or potential conflict "without political entanglement." Indeed, the
very objective is "a show of force" or "a symbolic expression of support
and concern." The key to the point being made in the Handbook is that
"[u]nlike land-based forces," naval forces may be positioned near areas of
potential discord without political entanglement. The salient difference
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would appear to be the possibility of positioning naval forces near areas of
potential discord without introducing a military presence into the territory
of a foreign state, particularly one that is the scene, object, or source of the
discord.
This facility can be important in two opposite situations. In one situation,
the appearance of the naval force off the coast of a state may be designed
as a warning to those threatening that state or its government. If the naval
force is deemed to be located outside the coastal state and its consent is not
required for the force to be positioned in the area, then both the coastal state
and the naval power can reap the benefits of the force's presence without
necessarily implying any political or military alliance or arrangement, and
in particular without the stationing of armed forces of a major power on the
territory of the state concerned.
In another situation, the appearance of the naval force off the coast of a
state may be designed as a warning to that very state's government. If the
naval force is deemed to be located outside the coastal state and its consent
is not required for the force to be positioned in the area, then the coastal
state is in a position to react to the message as it deems best without the need
to defend its territory from intrusion, while the naval power is in a position
to send a very strong and direct message without necessarily entangling itself
in armed hostilities.
To an important degree, the positioning of the naval force in both of these
scenarios depends on the coastal state's perception of the extent of its maritime
territory and jurisdiction. In some circumstances, the political or military
consequences of entering a maritime area claimed by the coastal state may
be the same whether or not that claim is recognized by the naval power.
If the purpose of the mission is to support the government of the coastal state,
one would presumably prefer to avoid, if possible, a potentially embarrassing
dispute over an intrusion into what the coastal state regards as its territory.
If the purpose of the mission is to warn the government of the coastal state
while minimizing the risk of direct military engagement, the risk of a military
or political reaction to an intrusion into the state's claimed waters must be
considered even if the claim is not recognized by the naval power (and perhaps
others).37
This, then, is a third illustration of the basic point, referred to earlier,
central to the relationship between the law of the sea and naval and air
operations at sea.

Naval and Air Operations at Sea,
International Law and Domestic Politics
The influence of the international law of the sea on domestic politics has
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two important implications for naval and air operations at sea. Both relate
to the restraints on and costs of deploying naval or air forces in furtherance
of political, military or economic objectives.
A deployment may be opposed for legal reasons by either supporters or
opponents of a mission. Legal objections may preclude a decision to deploy,
may increase the domestic political costs of the deployment, or may erode
domestic support for the mission and more generally for the maintenance of
military and naval options. The greater the doubts about the international
legality of a naval operation, the greater the difficulty one may encounter
in assembling and maintaining the necessary domestic support. A foreign
ministry will not necessarily accept a navy's view of what the law permits;
a legislature will not necessarily accept a foreign ministry's view; and an
informed public will not necessarily accept the legislature's view. In brief,
the international pedigree of the platform of principle on which a naval
mission is based must be almost, if not quite, as great for domestic reasons
as for international ones.
The maritime interests of a large naval power are by no means limited
to the preservation of its options to deploy its navy at will to different parts
of the world. Like those of most coastal states, its people would probably
want uninvited foreign navies to stay far away, control of as much of the
ocean's natural resources off the coast as possible, stronger measures to
intercept illegal immigrants and smugglers, and would probably fear an
environmental catastrophe not only from tankers and oil rigs off the coast
but perhaps from nuclear armed or powered warships or aircraft. If the
paradigm coastal state might prefer a thousand-mile territorial sea for itself
without regard to the global consequences, the paradigm maritime power,
since it is also a coastal state, would probably prefer a thousand-mile
territorial sea for itself and a three-mile territorial sea for everyone else.
Limiting the authority of coastal states over the use of the sea off their
coasts is important to global navies and, more broadly, global deployment
of armed forces; to international trade and communications; and to those
fishermen who seek their livelihood off foreign coasts rather than their own.
Most remaining ocean interests either favor increased control of the sea by
coastal nations, or are unconcerned with the issue. Accordingly, the legislators
of even great naval powers are under constant pressure to expand the coastal
state's control over the oceans in one area or another or for one purpose or
another.
This pressure presents a global navy with two problems. First, it cannot
plausibly assert rights off foreign coasts that its own government denies
foreign ships or aircraft off its own coast. Second, aD;.d more seriously,
increasing unilateral assertions of coastal state jurisdiction by the great naval
powers tends to legitimate the notion that each coastal state may unilaterally
assert control over activities off its coast to the extent such an assertion serves
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its interests. The fact that a global naval power may perceive an interest in
coastal state control of fishing vessels but not warships does not, from this
perspective, preclude some other state from calculating its interests in a
different way and making different kinds of unilateral claims. The whims
of a quixotic national legislature are unlikely to provide a firm foundation
for a platform of principle from which to seek global acquiescence in the
definition and exercise of legal rights.
The problem is even more severe if the global navy is attempting to
harmonize perceptions of legality around a particular articulation of the law,
in this case the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. The key to this effort
is the legitimacy not merely (and in some cases not principally) of the
particular rule set forth in the Convention, but rather the legitimacy that
flows from the notion that the Convention itselfis the reflection of the positive
will of the community of states. Quite apart from the controversy over deep
seabed mining, if the legislature of the naval power exercises the option to
ignore certain proscriptions of the Convention, why should other states not
ignore other proscriptions?
Given the strong competing pressures on their own government and
legislature, the promoters of a law of the sea conducive to foreign
acquiescence in global naval operations are constantly attempting to prevent
domestic laws or actions, often in response to problems of the moment, that
would undermine the navy's long-term global legal position and strategy.
Their ability to persuade their own government to respect certain rules and
restraints depends in part on what domestic decision-makers and their advisers
believe international law requires.
Whether or not one may properly characterize as wishful thinking the view
that customary international law based on the 1982 U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea will restrain the behavior of foreign governments as much
as a ratified Convention would, there is no basis whatever for believing that
the United States Congress, in the face of political pressures to the contrary,
is as likely to respect the restraints imposed by an unratified treaty as it is
a ratified one. Indeed, as a matter of the pure theory of customary
international law, it is likely that international custom and practice would
rather quickly conform to virtually any coastal state claim likely to be made
by the United States, precisely because the state with perhaps the greatest
interest in opposing and capacity to oppose the emergence of such custom
and practice is the one making the claim in the first place.
No international legal strategy can alone solve the domestic problem. Those
responsible for promoting a legal climate conducive to protecting the option
of present and future governments to deploy naval forces to any part of the
sea must however recognize that a strategy for ensuring domestic restraint
is at least as important as a strategy for ensuring foreign restraint. Indeed,
an excessive claim by one foreign state may well have no operational
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significance and limited legal impact. On the other hand, every domestic claim
by a major naval power automatically limits the options of its navy in every
part of the world, and frequently tempts significant numbers of foreign
governments to make even more ambitious claims.
Conclusion
The willingness of foreign governments to acquiesce in naval operations
has an important bearing on the range, cost and utility of options to maint;1in
and deploy a navy off foreign shores. The perceptions of foreign governments
regarding the rights and obligations of states with respect to naval operations
may in turn have an important bearing on their willingness to acquiesce in
such operations. Any long-term naval strategy should therefore contain
within it a strategy for influencing the perceptions of foreign governments
regarding the content of the international law of the sea and enhancing their
willingness to respect its proscriptions voluntarily. That strategy should also
include a system for ensuring scrupulous domestic restraint along similar lines.
Any successful strategy for achieving these legal goals will entail some
political, economic, and even military costs. Those costs must be measured
against the importance of maintaining the option to deploy a navy off foreign
shores and the likelihood and costs of obtaining by other means the desired
degree of foreign acquiescence over time and in all the places it may be needed.
Moreover, the alternative costs of different strategies for achieving these legal
goals must be assessed carefully.
The Handbook is a useful part of this process. At the least it encourages
behavior from United States forces consistent with the international legal
positions and objectives of the United States. It is a reasonably accurate guide
to the perceptions of foreign governments primarily because it is based on
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accordingly, it is likely to remain
an accurate guide only so long as the United States and foreign governments
resist the temptation to act in ways at variance with the provisions of the
Convention limiting coastal state powers in principle, and in particular over
navigation, ov~rf1ight and related naval operations.
It is not likely that many coastal states (or legal commentators) will
conclude that custqmary international law limits the freedom of action of
coastal states more than the Convention. Any significant change in the law
of the sea is therefore likely to be either neutral or prejudicial from the
perspective of naval operations, not favorable. The Handbook is therefore
correct in seeking to anchor the future evolution of the sea in the principles
of the Convention. It is also correct in emphasizing the importance of a
program of routine exercise of rights and freedoms not only to avoid
perceptions of acquiescence in coastal state claims but to enhance the
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perception that naval operations are normal and lawful. While the point is
not made, such a program is important whether or not there is a ratified
Convention. The meaning and effect of treaties may also evolve in response
to practice.
The question remains whether the objectives of a legal strategy would be
enhanced by a globally ratified Convention on the Law of the Sea. In
considering this matter, two additional questions are particularly important.
First, are governments more likely to respect the restraints on their freedom
of action set forth in a ratified Convention on the Law of the Sea? Second,
are missions for the purpose of exercising rights and freedoms protected by
the Convention, in the face of inconsistent claims or otherwise, more likely
to be supported by the Executive Branch.and Congress if they are rooted
in ensuring respect for a ratified Convention?
If these questions are answered in the affirmative, then are the benefits
of a widely ratified Convention worth the costs that may be entailed in
obtaining it? Stripped of the legal and political rhetoric hurled at this issue,
it comes down to a simple question of priorities.
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